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I N T R O D U C T I O N
Theories about the politics and economics of resource-rich or “rentier” states
have been around for almost four decades now (Mahdavy 1970; Beblawi
1987; Chaudhry 1997; Humphreys et al. 2007). Political scientists and econom-
ists have argued that rents have a negative impact on levels of democracy
(Luciani 1990; Ross 2001), on the quality of institutions (Chaudhry 1997;
Isham et al. 2005), and on economic growth (Sachs and Warner 2001).
Although much debate has been conducted over these macro-correlations, far
less attention has been devoted to the causal mechanisms behind them. There
is still no uniﬁed theory of rentier states, and the micro-foundations of
rentier systems in particular have gone largely unexplored.
As long as we do not know the mechanisms through which rents are distrib-
uted, and what kinds of interests and social relationships this process generates,
it will be difﬁcult to unpack rentier state effects. What is lacking in the current
debate, in other words, is a concrete political sociology of rent circulation.
This paper proposes a theoretical and empirical micro-basis for rentier-state
analysis by examining one core social mechanism characteristic of rentier
systems that has hitherto been overlooked: brokerage of state resources
through individuals in privileged positions. I will analyze the particular his-
tories of brokerage in six oil-rich monarchies of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) as case studies to develop my general argument. While the
latter is tentative and calls for future comparative research, my account of
the cases is more conclusive and gives us a new handle on the economic soci-
ology of six of the world’s richest rentier systems.
My guiding assumption is that rentier states, especially during early resource
booms, tend to be characterized by an imbalance of resources between state and
society. The relative abundance of state resources gives societal actors strong
incentives to seek access to them. Because rentier state bureaucracies are
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relatively inaccessible through conventional administrative channels, societal
actors seek alternative ways of tapping state resources. These are provided by
“brokers,” intermediaries who hold privileged positions and can make state
resources available to nationals and foreigners who are not as well connected.
Such brokers are a deﬁning feature of state-society relations in rentier states.
Although bureaucratic brokers exist in practically every political system and
in developing countries with weak administrations in particular, the speciﬁc
combination of abundant state resources and limited state capacity seems to
make them ubiquitous in rentier systems. “Brokerage” captures many of the
characteristics of state-society relations in the Gulf rentiers and is different in
several important ways from conventional, more general arguments about
“rent-seeking,” “clientelism,” and “corruption.”
Although a strict quantitative proof that brokerage is more prevalent in rentier
states is not possible, I do offer a qualitative account of their omnipresence in the
Gulf as well as a number of sector-speciﬁc quantitative estimates. As important, I
recount how Gulf governments have deliberately created regulations that encou-
rage the emergence of brokers, and in many cases have made mere citizenship an
important base for brokerage of state resources to non-nationals.
After developing my theoretical argument and linking it to existing literature,
I analyze a variety of important brokerage positions that are widespread in
state-society relations in all GCC countries and provide a general taxonomy.
I complement this survey with an overview of goods that are typically bro-
kered. I brieﬂy compare rentier brokerage in the Gulf to brokers in non-rentier
developing countries, and link my ﬁndings, in a more tentative fashion, to the
broader debate about the politics of rentier states.
Empirical sources for the article include one and a half years of ﬁeld research
and participant observation in the Saudi Arabian bureaucracy, and shorter ﬁeld
visits to other GCC states, as well as local press materials and governmental
and non-governmental reports.1
A S S UM P T I O N S A N D A RG UM E N T
The rentier literature has usually dealt with states and societies in the aggregate
(Luciani 1990; Anderson 1987; Shambayati 1994; Karl 1997). Alternatively,
rentier systems have sometimes been analyzed at the level of individuals,
with “rent-seeking” (Krueger 1974) or, in the fashion of folk psychology, a
“rentier mentality,” posited as a deﬁning feature of the behavior of bureaucrats,
businesspeople and citizens more generally (Beblawi 1987).
Between these extremes, there is a large gap in that social structures and
relations between political actors on the micro-level have been overlooked. I
1 I have conducted visits to the region continuously since 2003. My most recent ﬁeld interviews
were conducted in Bahrain in November 2008, in Saudi Arabia in January 2009, and in Kuwait and
the UAE in February and March 2009, with businessmen, and current and former bureaucrats.












































argue here that it is on this level that rentier systems provide the most interest-
ing and distinct empirical material, which allows for the richest theoretical ﬁnd-
ings. Even if one’s interest is in macro-outcomes, micro-mechanisms will
arguably be needed to explain them: lack of growth, lack of democracy, or low-
quality institutions—as far as they obtain—will be difﬁcult to comprehend
without an understanding of how rents impact the mundane social behavior
and state-society interactions that produce these results.
This paper treads into largely virgin territory since little has been written on
the political sociology of rentier states. My analysis will draw eclectically upon
concepts taken from the patron-client literature in anthropology and political
science, writings on corruption in economics and political science, and, in
more general terms, micro-oriented economic and analytical sociology.
“Brokers” between bureaucracy and individuals in society have been dis-
cussed in a few case studies on India (Reddy and Haragopal 1985; Khanna
and Johnston 2007; Oldenburg 1987; Jeffrey 2002) and are sometimes men-
tioned in passing in the writing on other developing countries. Although the lit-
erature on India offers some useful conceptual insights, on which I will draw, it
is based on micro-case studies of brokers in very speciﬁc social and insti-
tutional contexts. No one has attempted a systematic general survey of broker-
age roles between state and society, and there is no general model of brokerage.
The present article will treat the Gulf states as “critical cases” on which the
theory of brokerage makes particularly strong predictions. My analysis is thus
exploratory: If brokerage does not occur here, the theory will not hold any-
where. On the other hand, if brokerage indeed is particularly pronounced
here, this will allow us to single out and unpack its mechanisms with more
clarity, laying the groundwork for future comparative research. My ﬁndings
on the comparative prevalence of brokerage outside of the Gulf are suggestive
rather than conclusive, but nonetheless a strong case is made that nowhere does
brokerage reach as deeply into the lower rungs of society as in the Gulf.
Deﬁnitions
A broker in my understanding is an intermediary between state resources and a
non-state party trying to access these resources who is less well connected than
the broker is. Brokers can peddle access to state resources—and usually little
else—thanks to some kind of privileged position relative to the state. They
usually do this in return for something from the supplicants who avail themselves
of their services. This “something” can take many forms, including a direct
payment, some other directly reciprocal act, a more diffuse future-oriented obli-
gation, general loyalty, or signs of deference to the broker’s social status.2
2 For two useful conceptual discussions of brokerage, see Corra and Willer 2002, who call the
broker “gatekeeper,” and Oldenburg 1987. Neither engages with the macro-context I am interested
in.












































Brokers are usually individuals. Their brokerage function is often concealed
behind a more innocuous outward position: businessman, lawyer, provider of
“typing services,” consultant, prince, and bureaucrat are some of the roles
behind which a broker can lurk. Brokerage is not necessarily the person’s
main vocation; it is a function that many players can perform to various
degrees in different social and institutional contexts. Brokers in one context
can be supplicants in another. The more complex the system, the more likely
it is that transactions will involve cascades of brokerage, with several interme-
diaries between a good and its recipient.
Brokers can be ofﬁce-holders, but do not have to be. Their privileged status
can be formal or informal in nature; often it is merely their citizenship. The
resources they can provide access to include valuable information, state-
provided goods and services, and speciﬁc bureaucratic acts and decisions.3
The latter are generally individual, one-off acts, differentiating brokerage
from political lobbying that is oriented towards more fundamental changes
of rules and regulations. The more monopolistic a broker’s position is, the
higher the value of the access they provide (Corra and Willer 2002).
Conditions for the Emergence of Brokers
Some authors in the rentier debate argue that large rent inﬂows accruing to the
state tend to give it a particularly large role in politics and economics (Karl
1997: 59; Ross 2009: 49f.). A natural corollary of this observation would
seem to be that state resources will also play a larger role in both arenas.
This in turn should boost the role of actors who can make these resources avail-
able. Despite the great importance of brokerage for state power as well as quo-
tidian social practices in rentier states, this has not yet been clearly spelled out
in the literature, and the consequences of this causal conjecture for state-society
relations have gone unexplored.
To be precise, what matters is not so much the absolute size of the state’s
resources as the ratio of its resources to resources in society: state services
will be relatively less valuable and sought after if society has enough pro-
ductive capacity to satisfy individual needs through private provision. Less
individual effort will be put into accessing state services and resources. Conver-
sely, less private wealth and lower productive capacities in society relative to
the state will reinforce the reorientation of individuals towards goods provided
by the state. The ratio of state to societal resources, however, is speciﬁcally
skewed in rentier states.
The disproportionate role of state resources in GCC nationals’ lives is
reﬂected in state provision of free or subsidized health, education, and utilities.
3 Even if they might not entail distribution of goods or services with immediate material value,
information and bureaucratic acts tend to be more valuable in the broader context of interaction with
a state that has more resources to distribute.












































As Figure 1 shows, the share of government-ﬁnal consumption in GDP has his-
torically been high in the GCC rentiers. Note that this measure severely under-
states the role of the government, since it excludes the oil sector that is largely
or wholly state-controlled.
This is only an aggregate measure of the state’s resources relative to society.
A more useful way to categorize material resources and productive capacities in
society is in terms of speciﬁc economic production factors such as capital,
human resources, and organization. These are distributed unevenly and can
therefore be used by speciﬁc groups to generate non-state services and
resources even in the face of a generally dominant state.
Different production factors are present in very different degrees in GCC
societies. While the private sector in the Gulf has by now accumulated large
capital resources and has also improved its managerial capacities, enabling
the privatization of at least some public service functions, the broader
outlook on human resources and labor productivity among GCC nationals
remains rather bleak. Excepting Bahrain, in each country the majority of the
national workforce is employed in the overstaffed public sector, compared to
a developing-world average of 6 percent (International Labor Organization
1994). Expatriates dominate private labor markets in the Gulf, where most
nationals are unable to compete in either salaries or skills. GCC countries
rank badly on international benchmarks of educational attainment like the
TIMSS, PIRLS, and PISA tests.4
The dearth of opportunities for gainful and productive employment for semi-
educated nationals denotes low societal capacities on the individual level of
most Gulf citizens. We should expect that this will drive them to seek state
resources, and to invest in becoming brokers rather than in private activities
that generate value-added.
FIGURE 1 Government Final Consumption as Percentage of GDP.
4 Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study, Progress in International Reading Lit-
eracy Study, and Programme for International Student Assessment.












































A resource imbalance between state and society is a necessary, but not sufﬁ-
cient condition for brokerage to emerge on a large scale. If a state, however
rich, delivers all its goods and services swiftly, equitably, and transparently
to all supplicants, there is little need for intermediation. Brokers can only
enjoy a privileged position if others are less privileged, that is, if the general
degree of state accessibility through non-brokerage channels is relatively low.
Unresponsiveness and low accessibility of the state through non-
discriminatory, public channels is usually tied to low “unfocalized” (i.e., not
personalized) trust between bureaucrats and subjects (Roniger 1990). This
tends to obtain in the Gulf rentier states, which have been built recently with
external resources, do not look back on a long bureaucratic tradition, and in
which bureaucratic posts are often treated as sinecures. Accessibility is
further limited through fragmentation and over-centralization of decision-
making structures that reduce the formal bureaucracy’s accountability and
responsiveness (Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority 2003; Hertog
2010).
While much of the writing on Gulf and rentier bureaucracies is anecdotal,
recent statistical research has found that rent income is indeed a strongly nega-
tive predictor for the quality of state institutions in a number of categories
(Isham et al. 2005).5 A simple scatter plot conﬁrms that all six Gulf cases
perform signiﬁcantly worse than countries with similar income when assessed
for “government effectiveness” (see Figure 3).
There is another, subtler observation to be made: although GCC states score
worse than other rich countries in government effectiveness, they are around or
above the global median. That means they are doing better than the great
majority of developing countries—a ﬁnding impressionistically conﬁrmed by
most of my interviewees with experience outside of the Gulf and my own
ﬁeld research non-Gulf Arab countries. What makes richer oil rentier states
special is therefore not a particularly low state capacity by global standards
(as Chaudhry 1997 seems to argue), but their low state capacity relative to
the size of their economy and their resources (as the brokerage argument
assumes).
What matters for our argument is the relative disparity of state resources and
state capacities, and it hence applies even when some of the coarser predictions
of rentier theory do not obtain. This relative disparity is arguably what makes
rentier states unique and interesting, but to my knowledge, the consequences of
this particular relationship have not been investigated.
Against the background of rich but relatively un-transparent bureaucracies, a
ﬁnal factor has affected brokerage in the Gulf speciﬁcally: brokerage can be
boosted through formal state acts which explicitly provide privileged access
5 “Large-n” studies employ many cases/observations, and in practice are usually statistical.












































to state resources for certain strata within a rentier society. Although such acts
are possible, and do occur, in many other states, it is the speciﬁcally high rela-
tive value of state resources in the Gulf that gives such measures unique impor-
tance there. All Gulf governments have given local business and nationals in
general channels of privileged access that have turned large swathes of local
society into part- or full-time brokers of state resources for those lacking
such privilege. This deliberate strategy to channel state resources through
local society has had momentous consequences for social structures in the
GCC countries.
To sum up, the guiding assumptions of this paper are that rentier states are
systems that, at least during a crucial formative phase, have resources that
are (a) disproportionate to the resources available in society, and (b) dispropor-
tionate to the state’s capacity of administering them and making them available
in a non-discriminatory fashion. This leads to the emergence of large strata of
“brokers”—intermediaries who specialize in making the state’s resources
FIGURE 2 Share of Public Employment Total Employment of Nationals (2005). Source: based on
Gulf Investment Corporation data. (No detailed UAE data is available; the ratio probably is close to
that in Qatari and Kuwaiti.)
FIGURE 3 Government Effectiveness and GDP per Capita (with Bivariate Regression Line).
Source: based on World Bank Governance Indicators, IMF data.












































available to individuals who are less well connected, be they locals or
foreigners. Deliberate state policies creating privileged access for local strata
can further boost the phenomenon.
The Argument and Existing Approaches: What Is New?
The term “broker” has been used before in the patron-client literature, for
example in the shape of the “patron-broker,” a higher-status individual who
provides access to an otherwise inaccessible institution or senior individual
for his personal clients (Roniger 1990: 3; Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984; Scott
1972). The meaning in which I use “broker” in this paper is considerably
broader: Whereas brokers indeed often are personal patrons of the supplicants
at hand, in many other cases brokers are on the same or even a lower level of
hierarchy than the supplicant. Moreover, the relationship between broker and
supplicant need not be long-term, and need not have the moral or personal
dimension usually found in patron-client relationships (Eisenstadt and
Roniger 1984). Finally, conventional patrons tend to have considerable
resources of their own, whereas brokers focus on mediating state resources
in a larger institutional context (Scott 1972). This is why the patron-client lit-
erature is relevant for the present research, but does not allow for direct com-
parisons, since the categories of actors involved overlap, at best, only partially.
Although this paper draws on insights from the literature on administrative
corruption, brokerage is not identical with it, but again broader. The main dis-
tinction is that brokerage can involve forms of inﬂuence peddling that are not
illegal, which can actually be formally licensed and, in some cases, encouraged
by governments. Moreover, brokerage does not always involve the exchange of
money for state services—it is often used for “softer” purposes of building
relationships. Corruption is clearly present in the Gulf, but it is not clear that
it is more pervasive there than in other developing countries. What arguably
distinguishes the Gulf is the ubiquity of brokerage in general.
Finally, brokerage is related to, but distinct from “rent-seeking” (Krueger
1974; Khan and Jomo 2000). Rent-seeking in its most basic form simply
involves one actor skimming off resources from another institution or individ-
ual. Brokerage requires at least three parties, rent-seeking only two. Moreover,
while a broker might siphon off resources himself, his main function is to make
resources available for others, and sometimes brokers get no direct material
rewards for this. Rent seeking is of course widespread in the Gulf—the scale
of idle state employment alone is staggering—but its presence as such tells
us little about the sociology of rent distribution or the structure of state-society
relations in a rentier system.
The closest existing concept to brokerage is the idea of “wasta,” a term
widely used in Arab societies. It stems from the Arabic root for “middle”
and vividly depicts the idea of social intermediation. Having wasta means
knowing someone who can provide access to something otherwise












































inaccessible. Bureaucratic and other forms of wasta play an important role in
daily life in most Arab countries; it is the stuff of much informal chatter and
is routinely decried in local editorials. Yet with the exception of one useful
descriptive account of the Jordanian case (Cunningham and Sarayra 1993)
wasta seems to not have been taken up by social scientists. Moreover, wasta
relates to informal, personalized inﬂuence peddling, whereas brokerage can
also be formalized or, even if informal, so anonymous and monetized as to
lose the personal character of wasta.
B R O K E R S I N S A U D I A R A B I A A N D T H E G U L F
GCC states are rich and relatively inaccessible through formal channels, while
productive capacities in society are limited. Where, then, are the brokers? The
short answer is that they are almost everywhere. The following section will give
a detailed overview of brokerage in GCC state-society relations, from two per-
spectives. The ﬁrst is a survey of a number of formal and informal positions
which are deﬁned through brokerage of speciﬁc goods. The second is an over-
view of goods and services that are brokered in more diffuse ways and are less
neatly tied to speciﬁc positions. The latter is complemented by a discussion of
two important general positions—ruling family member and bureaucrat—
which can be used for more diffuse brokerage of a variety of goods.
It should be pointed out that mine is a structural political economy account
rather than a thick ethnography. This is due to the necessarily broad empirical
scope of the article, and because the different variants of brokerage often have
little in common in terms of the cultural and linguistic concepts involved, since
they occur in very different social contexts and on very different levels of hier-
archy. Brokerage is a crosscutting phenomenon that is deﬁned by important
structural commonalities—in terms of the resources involved and the material
positions of brokers and supplicants relative to the state—rather than by cul-
tural and discursive ones. It is, in this sense, an external analytical imposition.
Gatekeepers around Senior Regime Players
The kind of broker that is perhaps best documented in the Western press and
popular writing about the region is the gatekeeper around senior regime
ﬁgures, usually princes and shaikhs. Part of the wider entourage around Gulf
VIPs, gatekeepers control access to a high-level individual and therefore,
indirectly, to the resources this individual can dispose of. “Gatekeepers”
existed already in pre-oil Arabia, but they have gained much in signiﬁcance
with the increasing riches, centralization, and administrative complexity of
Gulf monarchies.
Famous examples from the 1970s oil boom are Adnan Khashoggi and
Ghaith Pharaon in Saudi Arabia, who acted as go-betweens for such senior
royals as Crown Prince (later King) Fahd and Minister of Defense Prince
Sultan. Taking care of the nitty-gritty of large state contracts, they took












































notoriously large cuts,6 providing Western contractors with access to a
decision-making system that commanded large resources, but was informal
and opaque at its core.
Although the most ﬂamboyant gatekeepers of the ﬁrst oil boom are by and
large gone, the function still exists and is now taken by lower-proﬁle individ-
uals. The Tuwaijri family around King Abdallah in Saudi Arabia, and the close
merchant friends of rulers in the UAE from families such as Tayer, Tajir,
Ghurair, and Gergash fall into this category. So do personal secretaries and
advisors and, sometimes, close family members of senior shaikhs such as
brothers, wives, cousins, and sons.7 Not all of them monetize the privileged
access they can provide, but all can broker large-scale resources for third
parties. Due to the over-centralization of Gulf government systems and the dis-
cretionary power of rulers, the information-ﬁltering function that gatekeepers
undertake is of great importance.
Gatekeepers and senior advisors are generally considered more powerful
than other commoners with a formally senior cabinet post, whose function is
more technocratic.8 They have historically often come from non-tribal (“khad-
hiri” or “bayasir”) backgrounds, and as such have no status group to fall back
on. Together with the “contract brokerage” described below, gate keeping is the
form of brokerage that has imparted the highest social mobility. Id bin Salem
rose from being a simple car mechanic to become keeper of the privy purse
and lead advisor under King Saud in 1950s Saudi Arabia. The Darwish
family, of humble non-Arab background, worked its way up to leading advi-
sory positions at the court of the Al-Thani rulers in Qatar, acting as go-betweens
for foreign companies.9 Although gate keeping usually implies complete
dependence on the patron, the links involved are often “sticky” and stable
over generations and can lead to the cooptation of gatekeepers’ families into
the national notability.
Many ruling family members also maintain a traditional court structure
around themselves, which can include manumitted slaves and their descen-
dants, other servants, and “little brothers” (“khuwayy”), scions of servant
families with whom a prince or shaikh was brought up. The aggregate size
of these courts is large—in Saudi Arabia they count tens or even hundreds
of thousands of individuals10—and court positions are frequently used to
provide access to a ruling family member. This can be used to guarantee
6 Field 1984; phone interview with a former U.S. Aramco functionary, Jan. 2007.
7 TheMail on Sunday (6 May 2006) documents how King Fahd’s secret Lebanese wife acted as
a broker for friends and relatives to get them visas, jobs, and other perks through her access to Fahd.
8 Various interviews.
9 The Royal Cabinet, 24 Aug. 1960, Mulligan Papers, Special Collections Division, Lauinger
Library, Georgetown University, box 3, folder 61; Field 1984.
10 Interviews with senior advisors to the Saudi government, 2004–2007.












































legal protection, inﬂuence administrative decisions and contract awards, or
provide access to state services on behalf of a supplicant.
Several factors combine to give the access-brokers around regime decision-
makers inordinate inﬂuence and a widespread presence: the resources at stake,
the informal and opaque nature of the regime cores in all Gulf states, the large
number of ruling family members (between a couple of hundred and many
thousands) and the weakness or absence of more formal mechanisms to
access the elite.
Mucaqqibs: Paper Pushers around the Bureaucracy
The gatekeeper has a more mundane cousin, familiar from other developing
countries: the petty administrative paper pusher who uses his inside knowledge
and contacts in a bureaucracy to help applications along that would otherwise
become stuck. In the Gulf, these individuals are sometimes known as mucaq-
qibs (derived from to the Arabic verb for “to pursue”).
Due to the much larger size of bureaucracies and budgets in the Gulf, the
number of these individuals is probably greater there than in most non-rentier
cases. Again, the combination of large state resources with relative bureaucratic
impenetrability creates demand for brokers. This is not to say that some parts of
Gulf administrations are not working rather well and operating on clear formal
rules, after four decades of oil-funded development. Yet, the most efﬁcient parts
of Gulf states are usually not in charge of large-scale interactions with citizens
and business; instead, the most prominent “islands of efﬁciency” tend to be
insulated bodies like central banks, national oil companies, or utility regulators
(Hertog 2007; 2010). Service-oriented line ministries such as commerce, labor,
education, or health are often still slow and opaque by rich-country standards,
and hence they nurture legions of paper pushers.
Mucaqqibs are often lower-class nationals, frequently of non-tribal back-
ground, and sometimes expatriates who have invested time in establishing net-
works in such government agencies that they use to expedite paperwork for less
patient or well-connected customers. Although less glamorous than even the
lowest-proﬁle senior gatekeepers, they sometimes are under the patronage of
(usually lower-tier) ruling family members, whose names they can deploy to
speed up procedures.11 Mucaqqibs closer to senior positions have in the past
worked their way up to become full-blown gatekeepers to senior decision-
makers, usually on the basis of luck and persistence rather than education.
More often, however, their unglamorous work around the lower rungs of
large bureaucracies does not lend itself to easy social climbing.
11 One taxi driver taking me from Riyadh airport to the city in 2004, for example, earned extra
income by chasing documents in the notoriously opaque Saudi Ministry of Interior by virtue of a
prince’s patronage, about whose generosity he seemed genuinely enthusiastic.












































Paper pushers often run small “typing ofﬁces” in front of administrative
buildings, and some of them also act as consultants or lawyers.12 They seem
to be particularly ubiquitous in front of large passport and labor agencies and
customs ofﬁces.13 Different services come at different prices, and the better-
connected touts can also deliver services which are technically illegal, such
as coming up with “missing” documents and getting them accepted (such as
visa transfers of foreign workers, see below). Scarce coupons and documents
are sometimes leaked from the administration and traded informally.14 It is
usually obvious to all parties involved, including the bureaucrats, that certain
procedures are illegal; how spoils are divided tends to be the secret of the
tout. Crackdowns against paper pushers are rare and usually half-hearted.15
In some cases, such as in the UAE, “typing ofﬁces” are formally regulated,
and in the emirate of Ras Al-Khaimah they are now even allowed to conduct
ofﬁcial licensing procedures.16
Larger private companies usually keep their own “government relations”
staff, which specializes in getting access to government agencies, sometimes
cooperating with and sometimes supplanting independent paper pushers.17 A
European company I was associated with employed a non-Gulf Arab for just
this purpose on an impressive salary. He had little education and no grasp of
the company’s business, but an amazing facility in establishing contacts and
getting paperwork done; it was generally recognized that he was taking his
share, too. In the UAE, the job of government relations ofﬁcer has recently
been restricted to Emirati nationals. Saudi Arabia has ofﬁcially restricted all
mucaqqib jobs to Saudis (Economic Studies House 2002).
Contract Brokers
A less petty variant of the administrative intermediary is the contract broker.
This role entails the peddling of exclusive information, and of bureaucratic
decisions over government contracts. This function is usually performed by
well-connected local companies (sometimes under shaikhly control) toward
either foreign or less-connected local companies. The contract broker function
can overlap with that of the gatekeeper, as in the Khashoggi and Pharaon
examples, or that of Waﬁc Said in the more recent Yamamah defense procure-
ment affair, who has acted as private advisor for sons of the Saudi defense
12 Arab News, 15 June 2005; Khaleej Times, 20 June 2005, and 15 July 2006. Lawyers can be so
important that they have in the past even been taken on as joint venture partners by foreign
businesses seeking access to the state; Business International 1985. 199.
13 Khaleej Times, 28 May 2005.
14 Arab News, 10 July 2006.
15 Saudi Gazette, 14 Sept. 2004; interviews with Saudi businessmen and ex-bureaucrats, 2004–
2006.
16 Gulf News, 9 Oct. 2008.
17 See Oldenburg (1987) for a useful typology of middlemen according to their proximity to
either service provider or supplicant.












































minister. Here too, the modal pattern is one of creating access to large state
resources in an otherwise impenetrable environment. Contract brokerage can
also lead to rapid social ascendancy, though much less so today than during
the 1970s boom period, when many of these links were ﬁrst established.
Contract brokers can act either as joint-venture partners or simply as repre-
sentative “agents” for foreign companies, working for a fee that often depends
on the size of awards.18 In still other cases, businesses winning contracts simply
sub-contract most of the work for smaller fees, limiting their own role to that of
rent-seeking intermediary. The infrastructure of many companies during the
ﬁrst oil boom was limited to a desk, a telephone, and a fax machine.19
Closely related to contract brokerage was the introduction of “commercial
agency” regulations in the 1960s, which forced foreign companies to sell
FIGURE 4 The Mucaqqib. Saudi Gazette, 30 June 2008. (“Iqama” is the residency permit for
foreigners in Saudi Arabia Q1.)
18 Middle East Economic Digest, 5 Jan. 1979: 3 (henceforth MEED).
19 MEED, 23 July 1976: 3.












































their goods through local intermediaries, with the state usually being the largest
customer. Although agents could be established commercialists with a serious
distribution infrastructure, others, notably ruling family members, contracted
out little more than their name. Compulsory agency rules were generally intro-
duced when oil income took off, as were ceilings on foreign direct investment,
forcing foreigners into joint ventures with locals.20 Many large Gulf family
companies got their ﬁrst break as commercial agents, including Juffali for Mer-
cedes in Saudi Arabia, and Ghanim and Mannai for General Motors in Kuwait
and Qatar, respectively. Rulers would on occasion award agencies as personal
rewards.
During the 1970s boom, any local could in principle act as intermediary for
foreign enterprises, resulting in what Chaudhry with only slight hyperbole
called a “whole society of commission entrepreneurs” in the Saudi case
(1997: 153). Hundreds of thousands of small-scale national contracting and
trading enterprises were registered in the 1970s and 1980s. In Saudi Arabia,
the number of registered companies increased from 77,304 in 1975 to
144,436 in 1980, and reached more than 200,000 by 1985.21
Tenders for state contracts usually needed to be submitted through locals in
all GCC states, and were preferentially given to nationals,22 who were often
incapable of fulﬁlling them on their own. Relationships between contracting
agencies, contractors, and sub-contractors frequently were highly personalized
(Moon 1986). Even in cases when brokerage was not objectively necessary,
contract brokers tended to plant rumors that they needed to be paid a commis-
sion for speciﬁc projects to move ahead, browbeating companies into cutting
them in.23
Much of the apparently unproductive “leakage” of resources that resulted
was arguably part of regimes’ deliberate distributional policy: having local
companies share in the oil wealth without creating formal distributional obli-
gations, and channeling capital their way, even if it could not be immediately
put to productive use. This intentional, and formalized, creation of brokerage
seems to differentiate the “leakage” in rentier states from that in other develop-
ing countries (Reddy and Haragopal 1985) and, together with the larger size of
state resources, contributes to its larger scope. By giving a special value to
rentier state citizenship per se, Gulf governments created traditions of broker-
age that have deﬁned GCC business and state-society relations until today.
20 Based on a survey of Arab Law Quarterly, MEED archives; U.S. Trade Representative Reports
(http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-ofﬁce/reports-and-publications/2009/2009-national-trade-estimate-
report-foreign-trad); and GCC ministry of commerce websites.
21 Saudi Arabia 1985.
22 Montagu 1994: 65.
23 U.S. National Archive and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland, Record Group
59, box 1793, folders DEF 12-5 SAUD, and DEF 6-4 SAUD.












































Local business in the Gulf states have been playing a much more serious role
in contracting during the recent oil boom. Although commission entrepreneurs
are still around, it has generally become much harder to get a contract just on
the basis of personal connections and without demonstrated project management
capacities. Although many businessmen got their ﬁrst break as mere contract
brokers, the bust of the 1980s has separated wheat from chaff, favoring the sur-
vival of the more productive ones, and forcing companies to ﬁnd private, more
demanding clients (Vasiliev 2000: 454; Luciani 2005). Similarly, many commer-
cial agents, even if most of them have kept their national privileges and brand
monopolies, have built up a well-developed distribution infrastructure.
Yet, there remain cases of full-blown businesses that specialize most of all in
paving the administrative path for foreign companies in return for being taken
on as joint venture partners. Such businesses have often built up a close
relationship to speciﬁc government agencies issuing contracts that allow
them to gather insider information or inﬂuence tender speciﬁcations.
Contract brokerage within ruling families might have been curtailed, but it cer-
tainly has not stopped. Allegations sometimes make it into the Western press, as
is the case with former Saudi Ambassador to the United States Prince Bandar and
former Kuwaiti Oil Minister Ali Khalifa. The current Qatari and Bahraini prime
ministers also have a reputation for contract brokerage.
Today, the most important ﬁeld for unreconstructed brokerage of state assets
is probably not government projects but rather the sale and resale of
government-owned land.24 Because it does not directly drain the state
budget, it is easier to conceal; due to continuing population growth it functions
as a self-replenishing source of rents. The modal pattern seems to be the follow-
ing: Ruling family members receive land as a grant from the ruler or through
their personal control of a government agency. They resell it in turn to
trusted real estate brokers with whom they have a long-term relationship.
These then parcel the land out into smaller bits that can be resold to other
players on the real estate market (and are often resold again, making for
large cascades of brokerage).25 At every stage, a more privileged player sells
to a relatively less plugged-in actor and large proﬁts are made. In some
cases, governments buy back land, converting land handouts to more or less
direct ﬁscal handouts.26
The value of land can be strongly inﬂuenced through zoning and infrastruc-
ture decisions which more senior players often have inﬂuence over. The values
involved can be gigantic. “Construction” and “ownership of dwellings” con-
tributes between 10.6 and 22.7 percent of GCC non-oil GDPs, and most of
24 Interviews with real estate brokers, lawyers, and businessmen in Saudi Arabia, 2004–2006;
Field 1984: 99f.
25 Interview with a former senior Saudi bureaucrat, May 2004.
26 Tetreault 2000; Naqeeb 1990.












































the land involved has at some point passed through regime hands.27 In Saudi
Arabia, most of Riyadh’s land seems to have passed at some point through
the hands of either Prince Sultan or Prince Mishcal, often to be resold by little-
known but very rich broker families like Musa or Sweidan.28 In Bahrain, real
estate politics are highly charged since most of the island’s territory is owned
and resold by royals. (Some 90 percent of the coastal lands are supposedly con-
trolled by members of the Al-Khalifa, as Bahraini oppositionists have recently
tried to demonstrate with the help of Google Earth.29) Not coincidentally,
cadastral administrations are among the least developed branches of govern-
ment in the Gulf countries.30
Brokers in the Trade in Labor
Real estate brokerage is important in terms of value, but the number of privi-
leged actors involved is relatively limited. Possibly the largest market for
brokers in terms of their sheer numbers is that of trade in visas and expatriate
labor. About a third of the GCC’s total population, or some twelve to ﬁfteen
million people, are expatriates, and they dominate private labor markets.
With the renewed oil-driven construction boom since 2004, millions of new
work visas have been issued annually.
Supply of foreign labor however is tightly regulated in theory, restricted pri-
marily to the businesses that receive a permission to “import” foreign laborers
through government-granted visas. The formal domestic labor market for expatri-
ates is rigid, since they cannot switch to another employer (or “sponsor”) without
the acquiescence of the present one, and in some cases not at all (Hertog 2006;
2010). Most sponsorship rules were ﬁrst introduced with the oil boom in the
1960s, Kuwait being the last to impose them in 1982 (Atiyyah 1990).
The large demand for foreign labor in the Gulf oil economies combines with
weak labor administrations to create an inordinate number of brokerage opportu-
nities that allow businesses to skirt national quota and sponsorship rules. The main
mechanism for making the formally rigid labor market supple, and proﬁting from
discriminatory access to the labor bureaucracy, is that of the “free visa” market.
The basic mechanism is that a sponsor acquires more labor permits from the
government than they actually need, usually through a combination of inaccurate
documentation and privileged access to the bureaucracy. The laborers that are
imported on this basis are then resold on an informal market to other employers
who are actually in need of labor but could not acquire it due to their worse access
to the labor bureaucracy. Many of the better-connected sponsors conversely own
27 Calculations based on Gulf Investment Corporation 2006.
28 Interview with Saudi real estate investors, Jan. 2007.
29 Discussions with Bahraini businessmen; and Ogle Earth, Bahrain in Google Earth. At: http://
www.ogleearth.com/BahrainandGoogleEarth.pdf.
30 Gulf News, 9 Dec. 2007; interviews with lawyers and real estate traders in Riyadh, Jan. and
Feb. 2007.












































companies only on paper.31 Trade in labor, even if it happens in bulk, is not
usually an avenue of for social climbing; it involves few social or managerial
skills and rather reﬂects one’s pre-existing access.
Once again, the largest brokers are often ruling family members,32 since they
ﬁnd it easier to get “block visa” grants to import larger numbers of workers.
Brokers around them frequently do the reselling. Many free visa workers,
however, especially domestic helpers, are directly imported by petty broker-
sponsors. By one estimate, 95 percent of Indian maids come to Kuwait illeg-
ally,33 most of them through small-time sponsors. In the UAE, employees of
the Ministry of Labor are known to issue visas illegally against bribes,34 and
have themselves registered letterbox companies to import workers. In the
summer of 2005 they were rather generously allowed to transfer company
registrations to relatives in cases where they had more than ten establishments
registered.35 In March 2004, I spoke to a Saudi contractor with three hundred
employees of whom he had not imported a single one himself.
The direct service that sponsor-brokers receive from the state is only an
allowance to import labor, and no direct distribution of material beneﬁts is
involved. Visas are of obvious material value, however, which has to do
with the high demand for foreign labor that in turn is caused by the GCC
countries’ rentier nature: local riches increase the demand for labor in (often
state-driven) services and construction, while the relative paucity of productive
capacities among nationals limits the supply of local human resources.
Sponsors often use their position to extract additional rents. Labor traders
can skim off up to 80 percent of the salaries of the labor they sponsor.36
Many sponsors also demand money for visa cancellations when workers
want to return home, and ask for extortionate sums if workers want to ofﬁcially
transfer their sponsorship to their real employer. During autumn 2007 amnes-
ties for illegal laborers in the UAE and Bahrain, many sponsors refused to
return passports to workers unless they paid them back a year’s wage or
more.37 Language barriers, fear of detection, and low levels of education
among many expatriate workers increase their helplessness and dependency
on sponsors. Foreign workers are often intimidated into dealing only with
their sponsors even if they in fact have the right to engage with the labor admin-
istration directly, for example in the course of labor market amnesties.
31 Some 70 percent of construction companies in Bahrain are estimated to be “ghost companies”;
Bahrain Tribune, 20 Feb. 2008. See also Peninsula, 25 Mar. 2008.
32 Interviews with former Saudi bureaucrats, Jan. 2007; Arab Times, 18 Jan. 2008.
33 Arab Times, 11 Aug. 2005.
34 Gulf News, 18 Aug. 2008.
35 Khaleej Times, 15 May 2005.
36 Arab News, 4 Apr. 2005.
37 Gulf Daily News, 18 Aug. 2007; Gulf News, 13 Aug. 2007; Bahrain Tribune, 12 May 2007;
Peninsula, 19 Aug. 2006.












































Estimates of the number of free visa workers vary widely, but they constitute
a considerable share of the GCC countries’ labor force. The Bahraini govern-
ment gave a cautious estimate of forty thousand out of three hundred thousand
private workers in 2005. According to Bahrain’s minister of labor, some nine
thousand unemployed Bahrainis have been using commercial registrations to
import expatriate labor for prompt resale.38 A Bahraini labor inspection cam-
paign in 2008 showed that of 6,277 establishments visited only 3,644 were
actually active in business.39
The UAE in 2004 was estimated to harbor six hundred thousand free visa
workers, more than a quarter of the total workforce.40 A 2008 press estimate
of free visa workers in Kuwait is eight hundred thousand, out of a total work-
force of about two million.41 In 2004, the new Saudi minister of labor claimed
that 70 percent of the work visas issued by the government were sold on the
black market.42
If on the basis of the above ﬁgures we cautiously assume a share of free visa
workers in the total Gulf labor force of one third, this would make for more than
four million of them. Presuming that the ratio of free visa sponsors to free visa
workers in the whole region is similar to the one observed in Bahrain, we would
have about a million free visa sponsors, or more than all privately employed
Gulf nationals in 2005. It is hard to think of another country with such a
high share of access brokers (of only one type!) relative to productively
employed citizens. The estimates are of course rough, but the order of magni-
tude quite likely is right.
The scale of income from free visa brokerage is even harder to estimate, but
individual prices alone—which are better documented—are staggering. GCC
workers are reported to pay between US$800 and $8,000 to their sponsors
for a visa; the most frequently quoted ﬁgures fall between $2,000 and
$4,000.43 They are also reported to pay similar amounts for ofﬁcially shifting
their registration to a different sponsor.44 This compares to a monthly income of
many expatriate workers in the Gulf of barely more than $150. The annual fees
free visa workers often have to pay to their sponsors range from $1,000 to
$3,500, according to a Kuwaiti estimate.45
If we presume that of the four million estimated free visa workers an annual
six hundred thousand are replaced, and that the average free visa price is $2,500
(both low estimates), this would make for a total GCC-wide free visa income of
38 Gulf Daily News, 13 Nov. 2005. On Qatari free visa, see Peninsula, 28 Dec. 2005.
39 Gulf Daily News, 24 Aug. 2008.
40 Gulf News, 13 Apr. 2004.
41 Gulf News, 1 Sept. 2008.
42 Arab News, 29 Apr. 2004.
43 Interviews and articles from the local press of all six countries.
44 Interview with senior Saudi bureaucrat, Dec. 2005.
45 Arab Times, 20 Sept. 2008.












































$1.5 billion annually from the issuing of visas alone.46 This is in addition to
similarly substantial income from the other extortionate schemes outlined
above. Our estimates are on the low side: according to one Kuwaiti civil
society activist, the free visa market is worth $3 billion annually in Kuwait
alone,47 about 5 percent of the country’s non-oil GDP. Whatever the exact
ﬁgure, the visa brokerage market has a considerable volume.
Peddling Citizenship to Foreigners for Business: “Cover-up” Companies
Free visa trade is based on two forms of unequal access to the bureaucracy: The
ﬁrst is access enjoyed by speciﬁc individuals who have either cultivated links in
the labor bureaucracy or who by virtue of their senior position can extract visas
more easily. The second, especially in the pettier variant of visa trade, is more
general access that is simply based on the privilege of being a rentier state
national, as exempliﬁed by the scores of unemployed Bahrainis moonlighting
as sponsors.
An even more brazen version of such “renting out” of citizenship is that of
the “cover-up” businesses (“tasattur” in Arabic, from “to be veiled or covered
up”). These are enterprises, usually small, in sectors that are off-limits to
foreigners, and therefore are formally registered under the name of a national
but are in fact owned and run by an expatriate.48 They include small-scale res-
taurants, grocery stores, service companies, and workshops—that is, most of
the hundreds of thousands of small enterprises clustered throughout the
GCC’s cities. Once more, it was usually boom-time decrees from the 1960s
onward that limited small-business ownership to locals.
The large scale of the phenomenon again reﬂects the low productive
capacities in local societies relative to the resources and demand at hand. As
in the visa trade, the players involved are both senior actors who operate on
the bulk level and use their privileged access to have dozens or hundreds of
companies registered under their name,49 and small-time brokers who might
sell their name for only one establishment. Many of the latter are reportedly
uneducated and jobless, and see the sale of their citizenship privileges as the
only readily available income. “Saudis engaged in cover up either have protec-
tion or have nothing to lose.”50
“Cover-up” practices are illegal. The occasional crackdowns are desultory,
however, and the anti-cover-up commission in Saudi Arabia appears to be
46 With the new boom-induced labor scarcity, free visa prices in many cases doubled in 2008;
Saudi Gazette, 16 Feb. 2008; Arab Times, 7 July 2008.
47 Kuwait Times, 24 Aug. 2008.
48 Hertog 2010: 164–67;MEED, 10 Dec. 1976; Bahrain Tribune, 20 Aug. 2007; Khaleej Times,
4 Feb. 2006; Gulf News, 12 May 2004; Peninsula, 28 May 2007; interviews with businessmen and
chamber of commerce representatives in various GCC states.
49 Saudi Gazette, 12 Aug. 2004; interviews with Saudi lawyers and bureaucrats, 2003–2006.
50 Interview with senior Saudi bureaucrat, Nov. 2005.












































“weak and riddled with corruption.”51 A study by a Saudi economist in 2004
estimated the number of cover-up businesses in the kingdom at 155,000,52
arguably a low estimate.53 Extrapolated to the total population in the GCC,
we might presume that at least 250,000 to 300,000 of these companies exist,
if not more, since both the relative size of the expatriate population and the
reservation wage of nationals are higher in most other countries.54 If the
average broker registers three businesses under his name, perhaps one
hundred thousand GCC nationals proﬁt from cover-up. Again, the estimate is
rough, but the sheer order of magnitude is impressive.
Monthly cover-up fees can lie between one hundred and several thousand
dollars per month, depending on the scale of the business.55 If we presume
$300 as the average monthly charge, then three hundred thousand cover-up
businesses would yield an annual income of more than a billion dollars
GCC-wide. Nationals can extract further ill-gotten gains from cover-ups
through the expropriation and expulsion of the informal owners.
Cover-ups apparently exist at the highest levels: in spring 2009, an Iranian
businessman sued Dubai ruling family member Hasher Maktoum bin Jumaa
al-Maktoum for US$1.9 billion, claiming that he was the actual owner of a
real estate company registered under the shaikh’s name in 2004.56 In
Kuwaiti, the national “owners” of cover-up companies are sometimes brazen
enough to apply for state grants reserved for innovative small and medium pro-
jects run by nationals.57
There are further, more diffuse forms of peddling citizenship as channel of
access to the state. During the pre-2006 Gulf stock boom, for example,
nationals acted as informal stock brokers for foreigners in several countries,
buying and keeping stocks on their behalf in return for a fee.58 Similarly,
nationals have used their citizenship privileges to enable foreigners to invest
in local property markets which are ofﬁcially off-limits to them,59 and are illeg-
ally sub-letting subsidized property.60
51 Arab News, 14 Mar. 2006.
52 Riyadh Daily, 19 June 2003.
53 Some 90 percent of the 542,000 companies registered with the Ministry of Commerce in 2002
were small enterprises, the majority of which are probably cover-ups. Ministry of Economy and
Planning 2002: 448.
54 The expatriate-driven economy of the UAE, for example, requires many more small service
and retail enterprises than nationals are willing to actually run. Interviews with Dubai Chamber of
Commerce staff, Feb. 2009.
55 Saudi Gazette, 12 Aug. 2004; Bahrain Tribune, 8 Oct. 2007.
56 Agence France Press, 9 April 2009.
57 Interview with former head of a small and medium enterprise support program, Kuwait, Mar.
2009.
58 Gulf News, 21 Mar. 2006; on Oman, see Arab News, 16 June 2005.
59 Gulf News, 29 May 2007.
60 Khaleej Times, 22 Dec. 2007, and 18 May 2008.












































Economic and administrative privileges for rentier-state nationals are not an
automatic outcome of rentier-state growth. They are however widespread in all
GCC rentier states and, not coincidentally, were mostly created when oil
income started to rise. They seem to reﬂect a redistributive strategy that
avoids creating direct material entitlements that could be claimed from the
state, yet allows nationals to proﬁt from the boom. Although other developing
countries can in principle also embark on such strategies, privileging nationals
is more affordable and much more rewarding when foreigners are keen to work
in and trade with a country due to its rentier riches. Brokerage opportunities can
come at a cost to productive endeavor, however. As one interviewee put it:
“Being a Saudi is worth money, and this can sap incentives.”61
Figure 5 summarizes the main forms of brokerage discussed so far, and
shows that it exists on all social levels, can be dependent on speciﬁc personal
access or be generalized to the citizenry at large, and can, but does not have to,
draw on formal regulatory privileges.
Goods Diffusely Brokered
The article has thus far looked at speciﬁc functional positions of brokerage tied
to the intermediation of speciﬁc state-provided goods. Such mechanisms are the
easiest to delimit and their scale is easiest to estimate, relatively speaking.
There are however also state resources that can be diffusely brokered
through a multitude of social and organizational positions, and conversely
there are positions which allow their occupants brokerage of a multitude of
different goods through a variety of channels. It is often in these types of
exchange that relationships are more diffuse, longer-term, and less monetized.
In this regard, they are closer to conventional patron-client relationships, yet
they do not necessarily involve the hierarchical relationships that characterize
the latter.
Diffusely brokered goods and multifunctional brokerage positions are too
amorphous to be comprehensively documented and categorized, let alone
measured with any degree of precision. Field research in the Gulf shows that
they are pervasive, however, not least due to the extensive scope of state ser-
vices. I will ﬁrst discuss goods, then positions.
To be sure, certain public services are delivered relatively smoothly in the
Gulf; provision of and access to basic healthcare and basic education, while
often brokered goods in the past, nowadays tend to be much better. While
getting water and electricity connections can still be difﬁcult, privatization
and competition have strongly reduced the importance of wasta in telecoms ser-
vices, too. Even if some basic provisions are de facto guaranteed, however,
Gulf states aim to offer an extensive range of free or subsidized services
61 Interview with a senior Saudi bureaucrat, Jan. 2007.












































above and beyond the basic level. This ambition allows for extensive brokerage
of higher-quality services.
Most health services are still provided publicly in the Gulf, and coverage in
principle is comprehensive. Different from developing countries, the scope of
services is rather large, and in contrast with most developed countries, service
provision is largely free, at least in theory. In fact, however, hospital resources
are often stretched, quality is mixed, and health administrations are opaque and
sometimes corrupt. To receive anything above basic care through formal chan-
nels can be difﬁcult.
State-provided health services therefore are an important brokerage resource
that can be relayed through a variety of actors: ruling family members, senior
bureaucrats, or simply friends and relatives with better personal links to speciﬁc
health institutions (Shah et al. 1996; interviews). Government payments for
treatment abroad are brokered particularly frequently.62
The situation in education, higher education in particular, is similar. Much of
it is still state-provided, access in principle is universal but in fact can depend
on one’s connections because admission bureaucracies are often opaque and
there are no meaningful appeals mechanisms. Scholarships for study in the
West or access to prestigious degree programs at home can depend on wasta,
on intermediaries with privileged access.63
Finally, government jobs and promotions are an important resource in
brokerage games. Although some smaller elite sections of Gulf bureaucracies
are reasonably meritocratic, others are staffed with much “deadwood,” a
FIGURE 5 Types of Access Brokers in the Gulf.
62 Interviews with Saudi and Kuwaiti citizens, businessmen, and bureaucrats, some of whom
were active in the health sector), 2004–2009; Kuwait Times, 11 Nov. 2007; Arab News, 11 Nov.
2008.
63 Arab News, 16 Sept. 2007, and 10 Aug. 2008.












































good share of which result from appointments that have been arranged through
brokers.64 These brokers are usually senior ﬁgures in the regime, often ruling
family members. Because the civil service plays an inordinately large role in
the labor market for nationals who lack competitiveness in the private
market, hoping for the right wasta can be a rational strategy.
The public services outlined above can be accessed through brokers of
various kinds. Conversely, certain social and organizational positions lend
themselves to brokerage of more than one good. The most important multifunc-
tional brokers are bureaucrats and members of ruling families, followed by
other members of the social elite such as merchants and notables.
Bureaucrats are involved in day-to-day management of state resources, and
there are more of them relative to the total national working population than
pretty much anywhere else. The scope bureaucrats have for brokerage activities
depends upon the resources they have at hand as well as their personal discre-
tion over them, which tends to be closely related to the inaccessibility of their
particular bureaucratic agency. Not all bureaucrats act as brokers, but many do,
if only out of obligation to friends and family. Although the average bureaucrat
probably practices less corruption and favoritism than in other developing
countries, the overall number of bureaucrats and resources available is much
higher. Even if only half as many GCC bureaucrats exert brokerage functions,
their much higher share in national employment (more than half as opposed to 6
percent in the developing world at large) would create a much larger volume of
brokerage.
The lower the position of a bureaucrat, the more limited is the range of
resources he can usually make available, be it services of immediate monetary
value (contracts, subsidies, health and education services, etc.), or decisions of
indirect material utility (licenses, certiﬁcates, information).65 Complaints about
ministerial wasta are often heard in the Gulf, but it is often the only way to get
something done.66
Members of the large ruling families are the arch-brokers in the GCC mon-
archies, since they have the most immediate discretionary control over state
resources. Again, the more senior a player is, the wider the array of services
he can make available. Lower-level ruling family members, however, also
have more multi-functional roles because their social status crosscuts adminis-
trative boundaries.
Ruling family members are very active in free visa markets, in certain sectors
of state contracting, and in the resale of government-owned land. They are
64 Arab News, 12 Sept. 2007, and 16 Sept. 2007; Arab Times, 19 Sept. 2005; Kuwait Times, 28
Aug. 2008. For a historical perspective, compare Al-Awaji 1971.
65 Outside of Kuwait and Bahrain, bureaucrats outside of the education and health sectors are
mostly male.
66 Kuwait Times, 4 July 2007; Arab News, 12 Sept. 2007, and 16 Sept. 2007.












































probably the prime brokers of advanced health and education services. Well
aware of ruling family members’ discretionary patronage, nationals regularly
attempt to access them through petitions, and this in turn under-girds the
shaikhs’ social status and their reputation for generosity (Le Renard 2008;
being called stingy, “bakheel,” is one of the worst epithets in the Gulf). With
a highly centralized formal bureaucracy—to the extent that the cabinet some-
times has to decide on individual license applications—informal access
through senior ﬁgures comes at a premium.
In addition to bureaucrats and shaikhs, there are many other individuals with
diffuse, if comparatively less important brokerage roles. Large merchants or
notables often have privileged access to the state. In Kuwait, members of par-
liament can be important brokers. Parliamentary pork for voters exists in many
systems, but Kuwait’s legislature has a whole squad of “service” MPs who do
little else but make state resources such as jobs or health treatment available to
individual constituency members (Tetreault 2000).67 In all GCC states wasta is
also acted out more diffusely through links of tribal identity, kinship, friend-
ship, or shared regional background among individuals with differential
access, which can but need not involve hierarchical relationships.
Brokerage and Its Social Context
All forms of brokerage discussed thus far, whether regulation-based or infor-
mal, speciﬁc or diffuse, have one thing in common: an individual in a privi-
leged position makes state resources of some kind available to other
individuals lacking access. The phenomenon is particularly pronounced in
the Gulf because the state has large resources relative to society and is compara-
tively inaccessible. Just as important, governments have formally restricted
access to the state over the course of the oil boom, creating opportunities for
brokerage on a scale unthinkable in non-rentier systems.
Regimes had a clear motivation for this: in the face of limited local skills,
creating formal privilege was an effective way of cutting locals in on the
boom economy. At the same time, national privileges have created new
social boundaries, as citizenship has become more valuable and the social
difference between locals and foreigners more pronounced. Policies of national
privilege have helped to rear a local private sector, but they have also created
new dependent strata of rent- and access-peddlers, creating vested interests in
structures that are inefﬁcient in the long run.
In some cases, such as that of gatekeepers, brokerage still comes with “thick”
cultural baggage, while in others, such as the free visa trade, it has become little
more than a market transaction based on formal privilege. So far as brokerage
involves informal, personalized links, it is often equated with wasta in local
67 See also Gulf States Newsletter 784, 23 June 2006: 8f.












































society, a concept whose generic connotation is negative (Hutchings and Weir
2006). However, as is the case with corruption in other contexts (see Jeffrey
2002), actors often denounce the wasta used by others, but happily and even
proudly resort to it in their own context. With the increasing complexity of
state and society, wasta now involves not only kinship links but also friends,
colleagues, and acquaintances.68
The growth of both population and state apparatuses has increased pressures
toward anonymization and marketization of brokerage. They have also created
cascades of brokers on several levels. A lowly mucaqqib can act as a broker to a
mid-level bureaucrat, who in turn might enjoy the patronage of a deputy min-
ister who allows him to make state resources available and who himself might
be under the patronage of a ruling family member. In many cases it is no longer
necessary for supplicants to become personally involved with higher-level
actors. In some sectors, such as contracting and land trade, state-provided
goods get parceled out into smaller bits as they move down a brokerage
cascade.
Some of the structural effects of brokerage on state and society at large are
clear, while others require more discussion. Among the obvious effects is the
sapping of productive incentives for nationals, a frequent gripe of liberal
Gulf technocrats complaining about free visa or cover-up activities. Brokerage
opportunities increase reservation wages and deepen the division between
nationals and expatriates.
Brokerage also tends to undermine the coherence of policy implementation.
Labor reforms in several countries have been stymied through the free visa
trade, and the effect of recent investment liberalization policies has been
limited in several cases through the de facto need for foreign investors to get a
local partner to push papers. In Saudi Arabia, a new “one-stop shop” for
foreign investors has in fact led to the emergence of new brokers offering invest-
ment licenses to circumvent mandatory minimum capital requirements.69
Less clear is the impact of brokerage on domestic class formation. On one
hand, during the boom era domestic merchant classes were economically
boosted through contracting and agency rules. On the other, the process has
created individualized dependence on the state, depriving them of much of
their status as “class for itself.” Merchants’ families remain important, but
unlike the past they now tend to lobby the rulers individually.
Other forms of brokerage such as free visa and cover-up have arguably ham-
pered the emergence of national labor and professional classes with clear econ-
omic interests. Needless to say, these strata of brokers remain atomized
themselves—there is no organized lobby, whether directly or by proxy, of
free visa or tasattur interests.
68 For a similar processes in (poorer) Jordan, compare Cunningham and Sarayra 1993: 2, 14f.
69 Hertog 2010: 168–82.












































None of this is to deny that on the individual level certain social groups have
proﬁted more than others from some types of brokerage: Urban strata have dis-
proportionately beneﬁted from bureaucratic employment and contacts with the
state apparatus, perhaps comparable to the petty “intermediate classes” in India
that have capitalized strongly on access to the expanding bureaucracy there
(Jeffrey 2002; Harriss-White 2003).
There has also been a diffuse trickle-through and trickle-up of tribal and
regional identities into informal networks of brokerage in Gulf bureaucracy
and business, resulting, for example, in an unusually high number of Saudis
from the country’s central region in privileged positions. However, this
process has developed mostly as a result of rulers’ top-down decisions. Bureau-
cratic brokers might represent their region, clan, or family individually, but
there are few cases of collective “capture” of state agencies by larger groups,
such as we know from African or Asian cases (see Bayart 1979; Szeftel
2000; Jeffrey 2002; Khan and Jomo 2000). The only exception seems to be
Kuwait, where ideological movements such as the Salaﬁsts and Muslim Broth-
ers have managed to gain control over speciﬁc public enterprises in the hydro-
carbons sector thanks to a much stronger tradition of organized politics. But
their class basis remains diffuse.
In general, and in contrast with the Indian case (see Jeffrey 2000), bureau-
cratic recruitment and mobility in the Gulf are tightly controlled by a small
central elite and are difﬁcult to manipulate locally. Contingency and elite
choices played a large role in who emerged on top in the course of the boom
and, as we saw, previously marginal actors sometimes found themselves in
highly privileged positions. And despite a pro-urban bias, thanks to relatively
small populations most social strata have had a shot at obtaining at least some
kind of state employment. Forms of brokerage based on mere citizenship status
have provided further opportunities for marginal groups. The system in this
sense has not been as effectively or exclusively used to reproduce class or
status group privileges as the Indian one (Gupta 1995; Jeffrey 2002).
That said, the types of brokerage widely available to marginal groups usually
imply much lower chances of social mobility. Gatekeeping and business inter-
mediation have led to stellar careers when linked with the right patron-client
network. The brokerage involved in most forms of paper pushing, or the anon-
ymous brokerage that merely draws on an individual’s formal status as national,
is much less likely to transform the broker’s status.
B R O K E R A G E I N C OM PA R I S O N
The GCC countries seem suffused with brokerage. The striking similarities of
scale and scope of outcomes in the six different cases allows us to control for a
number of factors in explaining the phenomenon. Higher levels of political par-
ticipation in Kuwait as such do not seem to lead to less brokerage: although the
parliament creates tighter checks on the ruling family’s business involvement, it












































functions at the same time as a defender of citizen privileges and as a major
channel of brokerage itself. Size of country does not seem to have much inﬂu-
ence on brokerage levels, nor do levels of ethnic and sectarian heterogeneity or
the (absence of) colonial experience, nor the timing of state formation or of
“ﬁrst oil.”
It is hard to fathom intra-GCC differences in their respective levels of broker-
age. Anecdotally, it appears that brokerage is less pronounced in Bahrain and
Oman, as one would expect for two systems with relatively higher levels of
state accessibility and a less skewed relationship of state and societal resources.
Brokerage in terms of free visa trade and cover-up businesses seems to involve
a higher share of nationals in Abu Dhabi, Qatar, and Kuwait, the countries with
the highest state resources per capita70 and the lowest participation of nationals
on private labor markets.71 The more fundamental and deﬁnitive ﬁnding
however is that all of the GCC cases evince high levels of brokerage, as our
argument would lead us to expect in broader comparative context.
A brief diachronic comparison further conﬁrms our suspicion that the ratio of
state to societal resources, combined with levels of state accessibility, inﬂu-
ences levels of brokerage. Due to lack of detailed data, these comparisons
must remain suggestive rather than deﬁnitive.
I have mentioned that brokerage has decreased in a few bureaucratic ﬁelds
that have been professionalized or privatized. More interestingly, it seem to
be exactly the strata of society that have deepened their own resources that
nowadays rely less on brokerage: Although many Gulf businessmen were
little more than commission entrepreneurs in the 1970s, those among them
who survived the bust of the 1980s have generally increased their managerial
capacities dramatically and have learned to cater to private demand rather
than relying exclusively on ﬂuctuating state contracts.72 Their share in GDP
and, even more so, national capital formation, has increased strongly.
Given its higher capacities, we should expect business to put less effort into
making money through sheer brokerage. This prediction is borne out by a prima
facie comparison between the 1970s boom and the current one. Although the
volume of public projects is back to the heights of the last boom, there is
much less raw contract brokerage this time around, as local businesses are
instead competing for state deals through offering substantial services.73 The
new boom has not led to a reemergence of the hundreds of thousands of letter-
box contracting companies known from the 1980s.
70 Interviews with businessmen and chamber of commerce representatives in the UAE and
Kuwait, Feb. and Mar. 2009.
71 Only an estimated 1.5 percent of the UAE’s private sector workforce are Emirati. Gulf News,
25 Aug. 2008.
72 Luciani 2005; Hertog 2010: 137–41.
73 Luciani 2005; interviews with local and Western businessmen in Saudi Arabia, 2004–2007.












































Higher capacities in business have not been accompanied by a comparable
increase in productivity among nationals in general. Below the highest level,
local businesses are still largely staffed with expatriates, and most nationals
remain uncompetitive on the private labor market. We should therefore
expect that incentives to invest effort into becoming a broker have not
decreased signiﬁcantly. This indeed seems to be the case: free visa brokerage
has recently been somewhat reduced through government crackdowns and
amnesties, but the system remains entrenched. The same is true of cover-up
businesses. Neither, outside of a few streamlined agencies, has there been
any discernible change in paper pushing or brokerage of state services
through bureaucrats and ruling family members; interviewees report that
there has been little change since the 1970s in the importance of shaikhly
patronage in the administration.
Ruling family members as well as cover-up and free visa brokers ﬁnd it more
difﬁcult to evolve into a productive role in the way contracting businesses have,
while bureaucratic salaries in the GCC have hardly kept up with inﬂation and
important parts of Gulf administrations remain rather opaque. For all of these
actors, relative incentives for seeking brokerage roles have changed less than
they have for business actors.
State access is never perfectly equitable or free of effort, and brokers between
state and society exist all over the world. To my knowledge, there are no other
system-wide studies of their scope and scale of the sort I have attempted here.
Nevertheless, by comparing our account with the more fragmented evidence
from the literature we can sharpen our understanding of the phenomenon’s
range and its underlying mechanisms.
The literature contains references to “gatekeepers” or their equivalents in
centralized and unaccountable systems in very different times and places, be
it King Mohammad VI’s Morocco (Denoeux 2000), Suharto’s Indonesia,74
Peter the Great’s Russia (Zitser 2005), or Louis XIV’s France (Kettering
1988). Although the only detailed accounts I have found focus on rural India
(Reddy and Haragopal 1985; Oldenburg 1987; Jeffrey 2000), paper pushers
very likely exist in many places.75 Cases of contract brokerage are documented
for large parts of the developing world (and certainly are not absent in the
developed world).76 The diffuse brokerage function of bureaucrats qua corrup-
tion and patronage is also documented for many cases (Bayart 1993; Le Vine
1975; Szeftel 1982; 2000; Robertson-Snape 1999: 594f.; Waterbury 1973:
74 Robertson-Snape 1999; New York Times, 22 May 1998; Time Magazine, 8 July 2002.
75 When traveling by car from Saudi Arabia to Turkey in 2004, I encountered them around the
customs ofﬁces at every land border I crossed.
76 Well-documented cases include Morocco and Indonesia. Waterbury 1973; Robertson-Snape
1999.












































547f.; Wade 1982: 314ff.; Ledeneva 2006; 2008; Harris-White 2003: 79–81;
Jeffrey 2002).
The literature is heterogeneous and does not usually focus on brokerage (or
rentier states) per se, but certain themes do recur. The rise of the state and its
resources encourages brokerage, as do opacity and high centralization of the
administration. Privileged access is the main basis for the activities of
brokers, who can have a vested interest in making the bureaucracy appear as
less transparent and more arbitrary than it in fact is.
The corruption and favoritism described in the literature are often more
brazen and wide-reaching than in the Gulf, as are the obligations ofﬁce-holders
have to their friends and kin (Szeftel 2000; Bayart 1979). Nowhere in the lit-
erature, however, is a stratum of brokers mentioned that approaches the scale
of what I have described for the GCC. This is no surprise, since none of the
developing world cases involve such large budgets and state apparatuses, or
governments providing as many goods in daily life as do those in the GCC.
The best-documented case study of pervasive bureaucratic brokerage prob-
ably is Robert Wade’s detailed investigation of the irrigation bureaucracy in
a Southern Indian region (1982). Irrigation bureaucrats act as brokers of state-
provided resources and services vis-a`-vis peasants and public works contrac-
tors, using lower-level administrators as go-betweens. Despite pervasive cor-
ruption that allows mid- and higher-level ofﬁcials to augment their income
many times above their ofﬁcial salary, Wade estimates the direct ﬁnancial
costs of brokerage as rather low for peasants (about 1–5 percent of their
proﬁts). This apparent discrepancy can only be explained by the limited
number of brokers relative to the population at large.
A similar, if less detailed account of the manipulation of land records by local
bureaucrats in India mentions an average of two ofﬁcials per village, a far cry
from the omnipresent bureaucracy in the Gulf (Gupta 1995: 379). In his ﬁeld
research on rural elites in Uttar Pradesh, Craig Jeffrey found three to four
middle-caste individuals acting as informal brokers to the local administration
in each of three settlements that contained between 4,000 and 10,000 inhabi-
tants (2000: 1029). This is about one broker per thousand villagers in the
smaller settlements, while in our Gulf free visa estimate, for example, we
arrive at one free visa broker per twenty Gulf nationals. In Sarayra and Cun-
ningham’s 1993 book on wasta in Jordan, those providing access to the state
also seem to be a relatively few senior individuals serving larger communities.
Even if developing country systems are more corrupt and impenetrable than
those in the Gulf—as seems the case in the Indian examples—they seem to
provide space for fewer brokers than in the GCC countries. This is not to
deny that bureaucratic access in poorer countries can be as vital as in the
Gulf, but there is a quantitative difference in that most GCC citizen have to
deal with their bureaucracy much more frequently than does the average
Indian peasant.












































Further evidence for the wider presence of brokers among Gulf citizens is
that many of them are lower-class individuals, who seem to predominate in par-
ticular lines of brokerage, such as paper pushing. In India, by contrast, few individ-
uals below the country’s “intermediate classes” (Harriss-White 2003; Jeffrey 2000)
manage to carve out brokerage positions.77 In the literature on Africa, too, broker-
age seems to mostly involve privileged strata (Bayart 1993; Le Vine 1975;
Szeftel 1982; 2000).
In addition to the putative quantitative differences, there are also qualitative
differences between brokerage in the Gulf and elsewhere. The non-Gulf litera-
ture holds no examples of individuals brokering their status as nationals
through mechanisms such as trade in free visa or cover-up business licenses.
Rentier citizenship seems to impart unique opportunities in this regard.
Rentier resources have allowed the GCC states to engage in a special redistri-
butive strategy in which citizenship plays a pivotal role, and can itself become a
brokered good, as has happened for example in Kuwaiti and Bahrain. Some
Kuwaiti nationals reportedly offer to register expatriate Arabs’ children as
their own for a fee of $35,000 to $70,000.78
Conversely, there are forms of brokerage in the wider world that are absent or
only marginally present in the GCC. Brokerage of state resources through pol-
itical machines, parties, and career political bosses, known from the United
States, India, Africa, and Latin America (Jeffrey 2002; Johnston 1979;
Schmitt 1974; Lemarchand 1972; Wantchekon 2003; Van de Walle 2003;
Szeftel 2000; Fox 1994) is absent in the Gulf with the partial exception of
the Kuwaiti parliament.
Some developing countries such as Indonesia also have seen the sale of
ofﬁces through senior bureaucrats (Kristiansen and Ramli 2006), and in
India there are shadow markets in government jobs that exclude speciﬁc
social strata (Jeffrey 2000). Such phenomena are hardly known in the more dis-
creet Gulf, where jobs are rather used as tokens of soft, personalized patronage
controlled by high-level ﬁgures. Bureaucracies in the Gulf are comparatively
more institutionalized and contain fewer full-scale “prebends” (Van de Walle
2003) below the highest level. Although bureaucratic posts can be given as a
reward, the intended enrichment tends to take place through salaries rather
than through “planned corruption.”
In general, in the GCC distributional brokerage seems to be stronger than the
extortionate corruption familiar from developing countries, where supplicants
engage in an exchange not to receive a service of material value, but simply
77 Although the intermediate classes are “numerically vast” (Harriss-White 2003: 48), they con-
stitute a minority.
78 Kuwait Times, 4 Jan. 2009. Nigeria, another, much poorer oil state has also seen the emer-
gence of “cover-up” businesses in its private sector after the formal nationalization of small and
medium enterprises during the 1970s oil boom decade (Lewis 2007: 138).












































for the privilege of being left alone by the state, be it the police, tax authorities,
or health and safety inspectors (Bayart 1993; Jeffrey 2000).
C O N C L U S I O N
In this paper I have developed a simple model to explain why “brokers” of state
resources emerge, and I have presented evidence of brokerage in the GCC
countries across sectors and over time. I have also brieﬂy compared brokerage
in the Gulf with some of the available fragmentary evidence from other cases.
These comparisons have pointed to further sub-types of brokerage outside of
the GCC, but they also seem to show underlying causes for brokerage to be
the same, regardless of the social level or level of formality it is embedded in.
Brokerage emerges due to both structural causes—low state capacity and
large state resources—and speciﬁc government policies of creating national pri-
vileges and formal exclusion. The latter however will only induce large-scale
brokerage if the former conditions are fulﬁlled. Therefore, large-scale,
state-induced brokerage is hard to conceive of outside of rentier states. In con-
trast to the general rentier debate, my argument focuses on relative rather than
absolute weakness of state institutions, and on the state’s resources relative to
society rather than its absolute resources.
Although brokerage is universal, the Gulf rentier states seem to be unique in
two regards. First, brokers appear to be more prevalent in the Gulf than in any
non-rentier state—hundreds of thousands of them among relatively small
national populations of several millions. Second, the GCC cases exhibit
some sub-types of the phenomenon that seem to be unique, among them free
visa traders and cover-up businesses. These are linked to the extensive use of
rentier citizenship as a brokerage resource and, in parts, to the encouragement
of brokerage by the state at different points in history through policies of
national privilege. In no other system in the world, it seems, is citizenship
such a prized and fungible economic resource.
The ubiquity of brokerage has important consequences for economic incen-
tives in society, for social stratiﬁcation, and for state-society relations. It can
make the state more accessible, but also creates great inequalities in access
and deadweight losses, and it can undermine the coherence of the adminis-
tration. Moreover, once a brokerage role has been established, it creates
vested interests that endure beyond the time when it might have served a
useful purpose. Cover-up businesses and free visa trade are notoriously difﬁcult
to eradicate side effects of a protectionist policy that has outlived its usefulness
as device for creating a national business class.
Politics of Brokerage
Brokers are a large “interest group” that has been left out of the literature on the
politics of development (Oldenburg 1987: 533). One reason they have been
overlooked might be that they are such a heterogeneous group, with little in












































common and interests that are usually local and highly speciﬁc. Moreover, in
the GCC many forms of brokerage are part-time occupations at best, acted
out in speciﬁc social and institutional contexts that constitute just a small
part of the broker’s life.
Only some sub-classes of brokers have collective political agency: ruling
families and, sometimes, sections of business. Contractors and commercial
agents in the Gulf have repeatedly managed to stymie ofﬁcial attempts at redu-
cing their national privileges (Chaudhry 1997; Hertog 2010). Beyond this role
of veto player, they have not pursued their collective interests as brokers sys-
tematically. Small-time brokers such as mucaqqibs, lower-level courtiers, or
cover-up business “owners” have almost no collective agency.
As I have argued, brokerage in the GCC context is, if anything, likely to
undermine class formation and collective action. Brokerage interests are indi-
vidualized, often personalized, informal and local in nature. As far as they
are tied up with illegal activities, political lobbying on their behalf is a risky
undertaking. Many brokers moreover are in hierarchical relationship to state
agents in a highly centralized and authoritarian system. In many regards indi-
vidual brokerage substitutes for collective interest representation (Khanna and
Johnston 2007), and some authors have linked the emergence of brokerage to a
weakness of the public sphere (Reddy and Haragopal 1985). With the exception
of Kuwait, GCC states score very badly on measures of voice and accountabil-
ity, making individual and informal as opposed to collective and formal access
to the state the preferred choice of most nationals.
Altogether, the tradition of accessing the state through brokers has probably
led to atomization of state-society relations. Though brokerage can also occur
among peers, it tends to be enmeshed in vertical structures of authority and
dependence which are, in the ﬁnal analysis, linked to the regime elite. This
works against horizontal interest representation. There seems to be a political
logic in this: Gulf ruling families have discouraged or sanctioned collective
action in their societies while encouraging nationals to present petitions to
pursue their individual interests on a case-by-case basis, which can result in
generous payoffs.79
Brokerage opportunities as well as many of the brokered goods can be
granted by the regime, but do not usually constitute a formal entitlement.
They can therefore be taken away more easily, also on a case-to-case basis,
which makes them a suppler instrument of patronage. Their removal is a
potent threat, especially if they involve illegal transactions. Competition for
individual spoils and privileged access can fragment and de-politicize
elites.80 Brokerage in this context may help to explain the persistence of
79 Interviews with Saudi businessmen and government advisors in Riyadh, 2003–2007.
80 On such political uses of “planned corruption,” see Waterbury 1973.












































authoritarianism in Gulf rentier states. While brokerage creates economic costs,
it also has political uses.
Given the important political consequences of brokerage structures, their
secular decline in the Gulf, at least relative to the last boom, is politically sig-
niﬁcant. With increasing nationalization of private labor markets, progressive
liberalization of business regulations, and, in some areas at least, maturation
of the bureaucracy, levels of brokerage are bound to decline. Due to inter-
national pressures, some states are now even mooting an abolition of the spon-
sorship system, which would put an end to the free visa system it its current
form.
Discretionary spending of rulers and some other core areas of brokerage
however are likely to remain untouchable for many years. It is no accident
that almost all economic sectors have been opened for foreign investment in
Saudi Arabia in the course of WTO accession except for labor recruitment
and real estate trade,81 two core areas of brokerage in which royals are strongly
involved and which have not evolved towards higher levels of productivity like
other areas of business have. Similarly, commercial agencies and real estate
remain off-limits for foreign investors in Qatar even after comprehensive
FDI reforms.82
The Gulf states arguably constitute an extreme case of rentier brokerage, not
least due to their policies of national privilege. Future research will have to
show how important brokerage is in non-Gulf rentiers, and whether it could
be the basis for a general political sociology of rentier systems, which have
too often been treated as black boxes. Much of the rentier literature does not
go beyond generalizations about patronage and the “buying off” of social
groups, leaving the speciﬁc social structures involved largely unexplored.
Brokerage is likely to be an important micro-mechanism involved in creating
various rentier effects, including slow growth, low productivity, weak policy
implementation, and weak political participation.
Moreover, rentier states are merely one sub-set of cases about which the
brokerage model makes particularly pronounced predictions. The basic argu-
ment made here is more universal: the extent of brokerage depends on the
balance of resources between state and society, combined with the level of
state accessibility. Figure 6 seems to impressionistically conﬁrm the general-
ized brokerage argument. The more extreme non-rentier cases that combine
bad bureaucracy with relatively high levels of income are all closely associated
with particularly ubiquitous clientelism and favoritism (such as Greece, Italy,
and Lebanon), or pervasive corruption (such as Russia and Belarus).
81 “Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority, Negative list” (of sectors closed for foreign
investors): http://www.sagia.gov.sa/english/index.php?page¼negative-list.
82 Simmons and Simmons 2007.












































This calls for further, more detailed research on non-rentier states, both those
with accessible bureaucracies and high levels of resources, and those with inac-
cessible bureaucracies and various levels of resources. Such comparative inves-
tigation will also allow ﬁner-grained conceptual work on different categories of
brokerage, potentially linking different types—coercive, distributional, formal-
ized and informal, and so forth—to different regime types and resource levels.
Due to the poor quality of data currently available, this will require further ﬁeld
research.
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